An estimate of the effect of FMVSS 301--fuel system integrity by Flora, Jr. , Jairus D. & O'Day, James
AN ESTIMATEOFTHEEFFECTOFFMVSS 
301-FUEL SYSTEM INTEGRITY+ 
JAIRIJS D. FLORA,.JR, and JAZZES O’DAI 
Department of Biostatistics and Highway Safety Research Institute. University of Michigan. Ann Arbor. 
MI 48109. U.S.A. 
(Receiwd 26 January 1980: in retiwd form 27 Mov 1980) 
Abstract-Federal Motor Safety Standard No. 3Ol-Fuel Svstem Integrity--was first promulgated, effective 
I January 1968. Its purpose was IO reduce the fatalities, injuries and damage caused by fires occurring in 
automobile crashes. it was subsequently strengthened (1 September 1975 and again I September 1976) and 
extended to all four wheel vehicles of Gross Vehicle Weight less than 10.000 pounds (I September 1976). 
This paper uses existing police accident and fire department data from a total of IO states to estimate the 
effects of FMVSS 301 on the passenger car crash population. Only very limited information on the rates of 
fuel spillage were found. co the paper concentrates on the rate of fires in crashes involving passenger cars. 
Some information on fatalities from the Fatal Accident Reporting System tFARS) is also used. Post-crash 
passenger car fires are rare. Reported rates ranged from less than one per thousand crashes up to nearly five 
per thousand crashes. Rates averaged about two fires per thousand police reported crashec or about three 
fires per thousand towaway crashes. Fatalities are also quite rare. in 1976. 814 persons were killed in 683 
vehicles that caught fire after a crash. In 1977,982 persons died in 858 such vehicles. Fire department data 
proved only of supplemental use, because a car fire could not be identified with a crash. Police accident 
data showed smaller post-crash fire rates with newer model year cars. While this is conristent with a 
beneficial effect of FMVSS 301, it could also be caused by an increasing likelihood of fire in a crash for 
older cars. A linear trend in age for car fire rates was statistically significant only in the Illinois data. 
Combining the data from 6 states showed a I@& reduction in post-crash passenger car fire rates coincident 
with the first promulgation of the FMVSS 301 in l%8. An additional 14% reduction occurred coincident@ 
with the later versions starting with the 1976 model year. A total reduction of 25% was estimated comparing 
pre-standard models with the current standard. These reductions were all statistically significant. While it 
was not possible to eliminate the possibility that aging contributed to the observed reduction\, or that other 
factors could have influenced these reductions, it seems reasonable to conclude that some of the benefit 
resulted from the standard. 
INTRODUCTION 
Passenger car fires following a crash are rare. Cooley[1974] estimated that they occur at the rate 
of approximately I fire per thousand police reported crashes as defined by the National Safety 
Council. When a post-crash fire does occur, it is frequently a spectacular and potentially lethal 
event. As a result, crashes resulting in fire tend to receive news coverage that makes them 
among the most visible of automobile crashes. Recently wide publicity has attended litigation 
involving damages sought from injuries and deaths resulting from post-crash fires. Federal 
Motor Safety Standard 30LFuel System Integrity-was promulgated in an effort to reduce the 
fatalities, injuries, and damage caused by post-crash fires. The standard was first promulgated 
to take effect on I January 1968, [Federal Register, 19671. It called for fuel systems of 
passengers cars to retain integrity (not leak fuel) after a crash and affected the fuel tank, filler 
pipe and fuel line connections. Compliance was to be judged or demonstrated by a 30mph 
perpendicular frontal crash into a fixed barrier, following which fuel leakage was to be less than 
one ounce per minute. 
The FMVSS 301 was upgraded effective with the 1976 model year of passenger cars[Federal 
Register, 19731, following some postponements of the initially proposed effective date. The 
main change in the standard was that following a 30 mph frontal barrier crash. the car should not 
leak more than one ounce of fuel per minute in any of four final resting positions-on its 
wheels, on its roof, or on either side. The current version of the standard was effective 
beginning with the 1977 model cars[Federal Register, 19751. In addition to the previous 
requirements, the current version specifies testing in two additional modes-moving barrier rear 
collision and side impacts. Following any of the collision tests, the vehicle should not leak more 
than one ounce of fuel per minute in any of the four resting positions. (A vehicle need not 
withstand multiple tests.) The 1977 model year standards applied to all four wheel vehicles up 
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to iO,Oa, pounds, including vans and multipurpose passenger vehicles. This paper restricts 
attention to passenger cars. Exact details of the standard in its three versions may he found in 
the Federal Register[ 19671, [ 19731 and [ 19751, respectively. 
The aim of the standard was to reduce the additional risk posed by post-crash fires. The 
mechanism by which this was to be accomplished was to reduce the incidence of post-crash 
fuel spillage. thereby reducing post-crash fuel-fed fires and consequently the additional injuries 
and fatalities associated with the fires. Thus, the most direct effect to be expected would be ;I 
reduction in the rate of fuel leakage in accidents, while the most important result would be :I 
reduction in fatalities and/or injuries caused by post-crash fires. These results should he 
demonstrated in the crash population if the standard is to be judged effective. 
DATA SOURCES 
Given the rarity of the event of a post-crash fire, and even more so, of fire-associated 
injuries or fatalities, it was evident that ;I large number of crashes must be available for study. 
This consideration resulted in the decision to restrict the data sources to statewide data files of 
either police-reported automobile crashes or fire department data on car fires. In order to he 
useful, a state police accident file must contain information identifying the vehicle by model 
year (and hence version of the standard under which it was manufactured) and determining 
whether or not there was either post-crash fuel leakage or fire. Additional information about the 
type or severity of the crash and resultant injuries would also be useful. Fire department data 
must contain the model year of the vehicle involved in a fire, and also some information that 
would indicate that the cause of the fire was a traffic accident. Again. additional information 
about the results of the fire and/or the type and severity of the crash would be very useful. 
Consideration of these minimum data requirements reduced the set of states with ap- 
propriate police accident data to six: Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, New York. Oklahoma and 
Washington. Data reporting varied by state. Illinois, Michigan, Oklahoma and Idaho had ‘t 
specific question on the accident form that asked whether a fire occurred. In Washington. fires 
were coded only if they were noted in the narrative, while New, York included fire as one of 
several possible second hazardous events. Oklahoma recorded age with a single digit, resulting 
in loss of information about older models. In addition to these six states, some data were 
available from a six month study by the California Highway Patrol, and preliminary data from 
the National Crash Severity Study (NCSS) were used. 
Fire Department data from six states were used in an attempt to see whether fire department 
data would identify more car fires from a wider population than police accident data. However. 
it proved impossible to determine which car fires reported in fire department data were 
associated with traffic accidents. Most car fires reported in fire department data are not related 
to crashes. It is possible that the standard, while aimed at preventing crash fires. might reduce 
the incidence of all car fires by improving the integrity of the fuel system. Thus, even though 
the fire department data cannot be related to crashes directly. an observed reduction in car fires 
generally, might by a serendipitious benefit of the standard. 
Fire department data on a state-wide basis are assembled by the National Fire Incident 
Reporting System (NFIRS) of the National Fire Administration. (now a component of the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency). The number of states reporting to this system is 
increasing yearly. Data from six states were used in this study: Michigan, Missouri. New Yorh. 
Ohio. Maryland and Oregon. The reported car fires from the first four were related to police 
reported crashes by model year of the vehicle involved, while for the last two. reported C‘~I 
fires were related to registration data because crash data by model year were not available. 
R E S I’ I ‘r S 
Only two data sources were found that had information on fuel spillage in crashes. These 
were data from the NCSS, reported by O’Day[l979], and the data from the Michigan police 
accident records in 1978. The NCSS data on fuel leakage appear to be somewhat incomplete. 
NCSS investigators did not visit the scene of the crash. The vehicle involved was inspected. 
usually after it had been removed to a storage facility prior to repair or junking. Fuel leakage 
was determined by the inspection of the vehicle for punctured fuel tanks. broken fuel lines. etc. 
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Damage that would result in large fuel spillage would be noted in this way, but small leaks 
would likely be missed. There is also the possibility that additional damage during towing or 
during extrication of passengers might lead to fuel leaks not part of the crash damage. In 
general it seems likely that fuel leakage is under-reported in the NCSS and would be 
under-reported whenever the crash site is not observed. 
Beginning in 1978, the Michigan state accident reporting form included questions relating to 
post-crash fires and fuel leakage. The investigating officer checks a “yes” or “no” box for each 
variable: fire and fuel leakage. The data are then coded into a four level variable corresponding 
to the four combinations of answers. If the item is omitted on the form, it is coded as a “no”. 
There is no provision for missing data. Table I gives the estimated fuel leakage rates for model 
years corresponding to each version of the standard. Two different rates are given from the 
Michigan data. The larger includes cases where both fire and fuel spillage were noted, while the 
smaller includes only cases of fuel spillage without fire. The rates from the Michigan data show 
large differences among the different versions of the standard. The rates estimated from the 
NCSS are much lower than those from the Michigan data except for the most recent models, 
and do not show much difference by version of the standard. If the leakage rates from the 
Michigan data are related to the individual model years of the vehicle, a strong increasing trend 
with age is noted. It is thus not certain whether the differences in fuel leakage rates are related 
to the standard or merely to the age of the vehicle. At present, the alternative explanation that 
fuel systems tend to become more likely to leak fuel in a crash as the car ages seems at least as 
good an explanation of the data as the assumption that the FMVSS 301 resulted in decreated 
fuel leakage rates. However, the paucity of data precludes any firm conclusions. The extant 
data do not contradict a beneficial effect of the standard, but they are not convincing of one. 
Post-crush fires--police accident data 
A variety of data files were found that contained useful information on the occurence of 
post-crash fires. The estimated crash fire rates from each source for each version of the 
standard are summarized in Table 2, where post-crash fire rates and standard errors are 
presented in rates per thousand crashes. The actual number of post-crash fires is presented in 
parenthesis. Most of the data are from state-wide police reported accidents. This includes data 
from Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma and Washington. The data from Califor- 
nia are from a special six-month study by the California Highway Patrol and were only freeway 
and highway accidents. The data from NCSS include only towaway crashes, which are 
somewhat more severe crashes than the other data sets. The data from Oklahoma included 
information on the age of the vehicle only for the 6 most recent years-earlier model years 
were combined in their coding system. As a result, the data on cars of model years 1971 and 
earlier are combined. This means that the early fire rate includes some vehicles that were subject 
to the 1968 standard. 
Most of the rates decrease for the later versions of the standard, which is consistent with a 
beneficial effect of the standard. The level of the crash fires can be seen to vary widely among 
the different data sources. While some of this may be due to different rates of occurrance of 
Table I. Fuel leakage rates per thousand washe\. Standard errors in parenthe 
Standard 
nata Source p-e- 301 301-68 301-76 
Michigan (1978) 27.17 
Leaks including fire 
(1.046) 
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fires in crashes among the different states. the largest component contributing to this difference 
appears to be differences in reporting criteria and methods. Each state has a code which is 
entered for the “second hazardous event”. In Washington, there is no specific variable for fire 
on the reporting form. The investigating offcer’s narrative is read when the data are coded at 
the state level and if a fire is reported in the narrative, it may be coded as one of several 
“additional adverse factors in the accident” variables. It seems likely that the Washington data 
would miss many of the fires, particularly the minor ones. However, the cases of conflagrations 
involving the entire vehicle would probably be included. The Washington data probably 
represent only the most serious fires and so differ from the other data (except for New York. 
which may be similar). which report all of the fires. 
-Data from fire departments proved to be of limited use. Most of the fire department data 
involving car fires involved non-crash fires. It was not possible to identify car fires with crashes. 
The variable “source of ignition’. could possibly be used for this purpose. It has some code 
values 41-(fuel spilled. released accidently), 5l-(part failure. leak or break), 53-(manual 
control failure), hl-(design deficiency), and ?I-(collision, overturn, knockdown). which could 
indicate ;t cr;tsh. However, these are also often used for non-crash events. while others arc alto 
used in the case5 of some crashes. The difficulty is that this variable aims at what actually 
ignited the fire, not at whether a crash was the situation that led to the fire. There is no variable 
that specifically identifisi a crash or traffc inv(~lvement. 
Attempt\ were made to develop a surrogate for crash involvement-a combination of 
several variables such as ignition factor, substance involved and location-that would identify 
the crash fires. A hampIe of three months of data was used and hard copies were reviewed to 
determine from narrative or other non-computerized information whether a car fire was asso- 
ciated with a crash. The best that could be done was to find oniy about 47% of the car fires that 
actually involved crashes, while about 50% of the cases found by the surrogate were in fact not 
crash fires. Details of this may be found in Flora, Beitler, Bromberg et d.[1979]. The rate\ 
reported in Table 3 are based on a judgement of the best codes to use as crash related car fires 
in cnch of the six states. In Michigan. the crash surrogate w:l\ used. In other state\. car fire\ 
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Table 3. Fires to crashes ratio (per 1,000 crashesHire department data 
Standard 








‘0.82 0.37 0.11 
7.92 3.74 1.20 
4.91 2.29 0.88 
2.17 0.84 0.23 
(Fires per Registered Vehicle) 
0.41 0.17 0.12 
0.77 0.57 0.29 
that resulted from arson or suspected arson were eliminated, and only those with ignition codes 
41 or 71 were included. However, none of these is very well associated with crash fires. Even 
after attempts to make the data as consistant as possible, large differences in the fire to crash 
ratios remain. These ratios should probably be interpreted as reductions in car fire rates, not 
necessarily associated with crashes. In the Maryland and Oregon data, registered vehicles were 
used as the denominator, since crash data by model year were not available. These rates are 
approximately one-tenth the rates if crashes were used instead of registrations. 
The fire department ratios show generally lower values corresponding to the newer cars. 
While this is consistent with a beneficial effect of the standard, there are’other, alternative 
explanations. The fire rates generally increase steadily with the age of the vehicle, suggesting 
that age may be a more important factor than the design changes that occured with the 
introduction of the standard. On the other hand, design changes could have been more 
year-by-year than all at once to coincide with the standard. While the fire department data are 
consistent with a beneficial effect of the standard, given the difficulty of identification with a 
crash and the alterative explanations, they are best regarded as only supplemental evidence. 
Figure I shows the typical pattern of the data from fire departments. It presents the data from 
New York. While the fire department data are consistant with a beneficial effect of the 
standard, given the difficulty of identification with a crash and the alternative explanations they 
are best regarded as only supplemental evidence. All of the fire department data showed highly 
significant age effects, with little or no additional effects coincident with the introduction of the 
standard. 
Analysis of police accident data 
Most of the evidence about the effect of FMVSS 301 is from the police accident data. It is 
not possible to completely separate age from version of the standard since the standard was 
0 0101 
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introduced at a specific point in time and the data about the post-crash fires come from a one or 
two year period of accidents. Thus, cars built when different versions of the standard were in 
force are inherently of different ages at the time of their crashes. However, since each version 
of the standard, except for the transitionary 1976 standard. has several model years of cars, 
trends in age may be investigated within versions of the standard. If no such trends are found 
or if standard effects are found after adjusting for such trends, then the evidence in favor of an 
effect of the standard would be more convincing. 
Age was treated as a covariate in a linear model to try to separate possible effects of age 
from those of the standard on the crash-fire rates. The model was 
E( I;) = B. + R,X, + &X2 + BJ3. (1) 
where E(ri) is predicted crash fire rate for model year of age i, X, is the age at the time of 
crash, X2 and X, are dummy variables that indicate the presence of the first version of the 
standard and the second version of the standard, and BO, Br, Bz and B, are parameters to be 
estimated. The variable X2 took the value zero for models prior to I%8 and one for models for 
1%8 and later. The variable X3 took the value zero for model prior to 1976 and one for model 
years 1976 and later. Thus, the coefficients Bz and B, represent estimates of the effects of the 
introduction of the standard in 1%8 and 1976 and later after the effect of age has been included. 
A model of the form (1) was fit by the method of weighted least squares to each of the data 
sets of police accident data. (The method of weighted least squates was described by Landis et 
a/.[19761 and an alternative formulation was presented by Flora et al.[ 19801). Figure 2 shows a 
typical result with the model (line) compared to the observed data (represented by “.“). The 
figure presents data from Michigan, 1978. Although a decreasing trend appears, the coefficient 
for age was not statistically significantly different from zero. Detailed results can be found in 
Flora et al.[19793. In all of the data sets but one, the age effect was not significant. The one 
exception was Illinois, which exhibited a significant trend in age, primarily in the l%8-74 
models, little trend in the rates was found for older or newer models. If a linear trend for age was 
included in the model, none of the standard effects was significant. 
Since the age effect was generally non-significant, the simpler model with just different 
means in the different standard groups was used. This model can be represented as 
E(r;f = B,X, + &X, t L&x, + &X4 (2) 
where r, is the crash fire rate for year i; X, is one for model years prior to 1968, zero otherwise; 
X2 is one for model years 1%8 through 1975, zero otherwise; and X, is one for model year 1976, 
zero, otherwise; and X, is one for model years 1977 and later, zero otherwise. The coefficients 
B,, &, B3 and B, are parameters to be estimated and represented the mean fire rate within each 
version of the standard. This model fit the data adequately in most states. The most important 
exception was Illinois, where the lack of fit chi-squated statistic was 25.96 with 13 degrees of 
freedom (P = 0.017). With the large numbers of crashes in Illinois, this lack of fit might merely 
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be reflecting the known fact that the model is an approximation. However, inclusion of a linear 
trend in age during the 1968-75 model years improved the fit substantially, giving a chi-squared 
statistic for lack of fit of 13.26 with 13 degrees of freedom, (P >0.4). A somewhat marginal fit 
of the means model was also found in the Idaho data, with X’= 12.44 with 8 degrees of 
freedom (P = 0.13). Inclusion of a linear term in age improved this somewhat (X2 = 8.47, 7 
degrees of freedom, P = 0.29). In other states’ data, the all means models fit well, with all of 
the significances of the lack of fit tests greater than 0.3. 
The 1976 and later versions were subsequently combined for several reasons. Relatively few 
cases of crashes were available for the later model years. The 1976 standard covered only one 
model year and hence will always be subject to data limitations, considering the rarity of the 
event. The current version of the standard was to have begun in 1976 but was delayed one year. 
No significant differences were found between the 1976 and later versions of the standard. 
Thus, combining the 1976 and later models was thought advisable to enhance the comparison 
with earlier (1968-75) version of the standard. 
Table 4 gives the parameters estimated from the all means models and their standard errors 
for the statewide data sets. Note that these are slightly different from the means obtained by 
combining data in Table 2. The data from Oklahoma have been excluded because of the 
inability to distinguish between the pre-standard cars and the first version of the standard. 
Most of the data in Table 4 show reductions of the fire rates coinciding with later versions of 
FMVSS 301. However, most of the differences are not sighificantly different from zero. As a 
result, results from any one of the data sets would be inconclusive in terms of whether or not 
there was a change in the fire rate at the time of the change in the standard FMVSS 301. 
Table 4. Estimated parameter\ and standard errors for the all means models 
?Ilchigari ?.!I1 2.50 
0.335 0.092 
l’ew York 0.3- 0.28 
,051 0.019 
bshington fI.?4 0.33 











COMBINED ESTIMATES OF EFFECT OF FMVSS 301 ON POST-CRASH FIRES 
None of the individual data sets contained enough data to show significant effects associated 
with the standard versions on the rate of occurence of post-crash fires. However, most data 
sets did indicate that what differences there were. were in the anticipated direction, namely, 
reduction on the post-crash fire rates with the more stringent versions of the standard. It is 
desirable to combine the information from the data sets in some fashion to try to provide a 
more definite answer to the question of what effect FMVSS 301 may have had in the accident 
population. 
The data from the different sources are based on different operational definitions of a crash 
fire. Even more so, they are based on different definitions of what constitutes a crash. As a 
result, the rates from different data sources are not directly comparable, nor should they be 
combined. In order to make these data comparable and to be able to combine them, the 
crash-fire rates were converted to percentage changes from one version to the standard to 
another. Table 5 presents these estimated percentage changes, together with their estimated 
standard errors. The 1976 and later versions of the standard were treated as one. The estimated 
standard errors were calculated by using a Taylor series approximation to the function of the 
difference of two rates, divided by the earlier rate. In the table. negative <igna indicate 
reductions in the crash-tire rate, while positive signs indicate increases. 
The individuaJ estjmated percent changes uere combined into an overall e&-iate of the 
percent change by using a weighted mean. The weights were inversely Fr~~~~~rt~~~n~~l to thtt 
variances of the individual percent change\. The combined estimatr i\ that there w;t\i a l!.h% 
reduction in crash fire: rates associated with the 1968-75 model5 a\ compared with the 
pre-1968 (pi-r-standard) models. The estimated standard error for this change IY 3.77%. .A further 
reduction of 13.9% was estimated from the first version of the standard t 196X-75 modei>) to the 
current f 1976 and later). Its associated estimated @andard error is 2.91%. Finally. comparing the 
current standard version {I974 and later) to the pre-standard models, give\ an txtimated 
reduction of 3.0% associated with thi\ change. Its Aimated standard error is .?.Sh”c. 
The combined data estimate reductions in the crash-fire rate associated with each version of 
the standard. These reductions are significantly different from zero. being more than four time? 
their estimated standard errors in all three cace\. It should he clearly noted that the limitations 
of the data prevent the exclusion of other factors a~ possible t;tuce\ for the observed 
reductions in post-crash fire rates. One may only my that the reductions occt~rred and were 
associated with the car models produced under different version4 of the standard. While the age 
of the vehicle was significant only for the Illinois data. age i4 confounded lvith the standard $0 
that its influence cannot be completely ruled out. 
It is also possible that the\< r&u&m\ were subject ti> large hut unknc~~~ hiasrs. .~lth~~u~h 
the combined estimate is based on data from zix states fptus ;I \;prcial study in California and 
preliminary data from the NCSS), the combined result is most heavily influenced by data from 
the states with the smallest estimated variances for the difference\. The dat;r from two of the 
states-Illinois and Michignn- influence the combined estimate strongly. Both state\ h;tve 
substantial numbers of crashes and crash-associated fires. Although many cr;t<he\ occurred in 
New York, very few fires were reported. leading to fairly large variances for the percent 
changes. The states such as Idaho, Oklahoma and ~~ashjn~ton w-ere Gmply too small to add 
very much to the combined estimates. If there \+xre regional difference\ in the effect elf FMVSS 
301 of crash-fire rates. the results reported will he biased toward the effect in the upper 
Midwest. 
Several other factors about the crash u;ere found to influence the crash-fire rate_ However. 
the data from different states differed so much in the variables included and the definitions of 
these variables, that no common set of factor< could be used in combination \h,ifh the combined 
data. Cooley[l974] found differences in the proportion of ;IcciJent\ with fuel leakage and fire 
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associated with several accident variables. The data used by Cooley were mostly from The 
Collision Performance and Injury Reporting File (CPIR) maintained by the University of 
~ichigan’s Highway Safety Research Institute. This file consists of detailed reports on vehicles 
involved in rather serious crashes. The data are not representative of any particular population. 
Some of the variables Cooley found to be important were accident type, part of car damaged. 
and collision force. 
Relation of fire rates to type of crnsh 
The present study also found marked differences in the crash-fire rates with several accident 
variables. For example, Table 6 gives the crash fire rates by type of crash from the Illinois data 
and the Washington data. Note that the Washington data contain only four crash types, while 
there are thirteen types reported in the Illinois data. It is evident that “angle impact” in 
Washington includes many more types of crashes than in Illinois. Even the crash types with the 
same names are not defined in the same way from state to state. 
The fire rates are largest for crash types associated with more severe types of accidents, for 
example, striking fixed objects, rollovers and head-ens. However, because of the frequency of 
the crash types, more fires actually occur in rear impacts. Rear impacts are usually less severe 
crashes, so that the chance of a fire is less in these types of crash than in some others. 
The speed of the car prior to the crash is an important variable affecting the probability of a 
post-crash tire occurring. The higher the speed, the more severe the crash and the greater the 
chance of a fire. It is difficult to determine speed in a crash. In Washington, the posted speed 
limit is listed and serves as a surrogate for speed prior to crash. In Oklahoma, the officers 
estimated a speed prior to the crash. This is used, although the accuracy of the estimation is 
subject to question. Table 7 presents the crash ftre rates by speed and standard for the 
Washington and Oklahoma data. Note that the model year ranges for Oklahoma are not exactly 
those of the versions of the standard, since the coding of vehicle age in Oklahoma combined all 
models prior to 1972. The rates for different versions of the standard, adjusted for the speed 
distribution are presented at the bottom of the table, together with their standard errors. 
Although there is a definite trend for the fire rates to increase with speed, speed distributions 
among the different model years were quite similar, and the adjustment has had little effect. 
Table 6. Fire rates by type of crash-lllmois and Warhington 







Rear Impact 110,440 4.16 SYI,C,l!~ 0. 10 
iiead on 3,793 li.‘!) 
SxlesLiipc 56,6S’) i.Sl 
.Angle Impact 53,592 i.il ?,X.i,i 1.13 
Turning 96,54!1 3.25 
Parked Car 55,181 3. 06 
Pedestrian 5,433 1.47 _I- 
Pwalroad Tran~ a65 1!),10 -_ 
Pedal Cyclist 4,633 1.08 
Annimrrl Struck 3,000 2.67 
Fixed Object 47,621 8.36 i3 5.i.i 1 .t1i 
Struck 
Other (included 13,432 13.67 
non-sollisron) 
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Table 7. Crash fire rates by speed* and standard-Washington and Oklahoma 
This was found to be the case for most variables. Since the definition\ of variables affecting 
fire rates differed so much among the states, and since adjustments had insignificant effects, 
adjustments were not used in combining the data. 
Relation of fire rates to damage severity 
In Michigan some information about the severity of the accident is given by the TAD scale, 
which scales the amount of damage to the automobile. Table 8 gives the crash-fire rates for the 
different versions of the standard hy the TAD damage score. The adjusted rate\ by standard 
and their estimated standard errors are also presented. Again, the adjustment ha\ had little 
effect on the rates. In general the fire rates increase with the TAD level. The rate5 are v~irtually 
the same for levels l-3, then increase somewhat with each level from 4 to 6. A marked increase 
in fire rates occurs with the TAD level 7. These are. of course, the very severe crashes. Viewing 
the TAD-specific rates suggests that the 301-68 version of the standard may have reduced the 
chance of fire in crashes of TAD levels 1-4, while the 301-76 version may have further reduced 
the chance of fire for crashes of TAD levels S and 6. The highest level of TAD appear\ to be of 
crashes so severe that none of the standards is likely to have been useful. 
A number of other factors could influence the crash fire rate. such af car size. Car \ize waj 
only available as a grouping full size, intermediate and compact. with fourth category of 
sub-compact in some states. The effect of car size on fire rates was investigated in those states 
AdJusted late 
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where the data permitted. No consistent relationship of crash fire rates to car size was found, 
nor did the distribution of reported car sizes differ significantly among the model year groups 
identifying the standard. It should be noted that car size considerations are complicated by the 
downsizing of cars of recent models as well as by possible interactions between car size and 
type of crash. 
Another complicating factor is the additional emission control equipment required in recent 
model years. The addition of the fuel evaporation cannister and the catalytic converter may 
provide an additional source of fuel leakage and an additional source of ignition, respectively. 
The catalytic converter was added to most U.S. cars with the 1975 model year and operates at a 
much higher temperature than conventional exhaust systems, providing a more likely source of 
ignition if fuel is spilled. This addition occured almost at the same time as the strengthened 
version of the standard and may partially have counteracted the beneficial effects of the 
standard. Inspection of the fire and fuel leakage data from the Michigan crashes in 1978 show 
that among cars in crashes that leaked fuel, there is a higher proportion of fires for models from 
1975 on than for earlier models. The probability of fire given fuel leakage for models since 1975 
is estimated as 0.0793, while for models between 1968 and 1974, it is 0.0521 and it is 0.0459 for 
earlier models. The chi-squared statistic for testing differences among these three rates is 16.41, 
with 2 degrees of freedom, highly significant. Partitioning this into a test for the difference 
between the rates for the 0 pre-1%8 and 1%9-74 models gives a chi-squared statistic of 
0.42, with one degree of freedom. not significant, while the statistic testing for difference 
between the 1975 and later model’s rate and the earlier rate is 15.99 with one degree of freedom, 
highly significant. 
In general, higher fire rates are associated with more severe crashes. The type of crash, the 
speed of crash, the amount of damage all are associated with differences in the crash fire rates. 
However, adjustments for these factors changed the crash fire rates relatively little, indicating that 
the small differences observed in these data in the distributions of crashes by these factors did not 
seriously affect the rates. It was not feasible to consider these factors jointly, so the question of 
possible interactions among these factors remains open. It is also possible that other factors 
influence the likelihood of a post-crash fire. In these data, although fire rates were found to differ 
widely by other factors, adjustments proved unnecessary, and the percent changes presented in 
Table 5 appear to be an adequate summary of the changes observed in crash fire rates in the 
accident populations studied. 
EFFECTS OF FMVSS-301 ON FATALITIES 
The Fatal Accident Reporting System (FARS) includes data on all cars involved in fatal 
accidents. Included in the data is a variable that indicated whether a fire occurred in the crash. 
In addition, the total number of persons killed in the crash is reported. Table 9 gives data from 
three years (197678) of fatal crashes. For each model year of passenger car, the table gives the 
number of passenger cars in which there was a fatality and which caught on fire. The third 
column gives the number of passenger cars in which there was a fatality, while the fourth 
column gives the ratio of cars with fire to all cars with fatalities. Little difference among the fire 
ratios is apparent, although the differences are statistically significant. What difference there is 
indicates that fires were slightly more frequent among cars in fatal accidents for the more 
recent models. A model with a linear trend in age fit the data well, estimating an average 
decrease of 0.00093 per year of age in the rate. While this is not what one would expect if 
FMVSS 301 were effective in reducing fire-associated fatalities, it must be remembered that this 
is a file of cars in which someone was killed in a crash. Given the substantial design changes 
over the model years, it may be that newer models are less likely to produce a fatality when a 
crash occurs, and that fire, while a nearly constant ratio with all fatal involvements, is actually 
less frequent because all fatal involvements are reduced. That is, it may be that fires have been 
reduced, but that other design changes have reduced the involvement of cars in fatal accidents 
even more, resulting in a nearly constant or slightly increasing ratio of fires in fatal crashes to 
all fatal crashes. This cannot be tested without additional exposure data, such as vehicle miles 
traveled by model year of the vehicle and perhaps other variables. 
If one restricts attention to rear-damaged passenger cars in fatal crashes the picture is 
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Table 9. Passenger cm with fatality--FAR!5 1976-78 
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-. 
wKie1 Year “lumber wth Fire Total ‘Limber 
somewhat different. Table 10 presents the data for rear-damaged vehicles from the FAKS 
1976~78 data. In this table, the ratios of vehicles with fire to all vehicles involved in fatal 
crashes can be seen to be somewhat decreasing for newer model years of vehicles. The ratio of 
fire involvements is 6.0% for cars from 1976 models on, while it is 7.9% for model\ from 1968 to 
1974, and 7.7% for earlier models. This would suggest the 1976 and later versions of FMVSS 
301, with additional testing requirements for rear impacts may have been effective in reducing 
the fires in fatal crashes where the cars were damaged in the rear. The trend wa\ in the other 
direction for front damaged vehicles, side damaged vehicles, and all vehicles involved in fatal 
crashes, however. It is interesting to note that the rate of fire occurrence in fatal crashes differs 
by part of the car damaged. Fires occurred in about 7.S% of the rear damaged cars in fatal 
crashes, in about 1.5% of the front damaged cars, in about 1.6% of the side damaged cars. and 
overall, in 2.1% of all cars involved in fatal crashes. Fires occurred in 3.1% of the vehicles in 
which a fatality occurred, emphasizing the additional risk of fatality posed by fire. 
Although the rates at which fire occurs in fatal crashes differed significantly by standard, the 
differences were small, the rates being 0.0238, 0.0311 and 0.0359. for the pre-301. firs? version 
and current version. As mentioned, this may be because of the self-selecting nature of fatal 
crashes. The distribution of vehicles involved in crashes nationwide is not known. However, 
the NCSS data may be taken as an estimate of the distribution of the vehicle< by model year 
involved in towaway crashes. If this is done, it is possible to compute a ratio of fatal fire 
involvements to crash involvements-at least as estimated by the NCSS. 
This has been done by computing the proportion of each car model year with fatal tire 
involvements, the proportion of each model year in the NCSS reconstructed population. and 
taking the ratio of these two proportions. This ratio is plotted in Fig. 3. and shows an improving 
trend with newer model years. The dashed line is a linear regression line. If the two proportions 
were the same, the ratio would be one. Model years with ratios less than one are somewhat 
better than average, while those with ratios greater than one are somewhat worse than average 
from the point of view of fire involvement. 
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Fig. 3. Relative proportion of fatal-fire involved cars to NCSS-towaway-involved cars by model year. 
If the NCSS model year distribution represents the national population well, one may infer 
that newer cars are less likely to involve a fire, given that they were involved in a towaway 
crash. Such an interpretation must be made with caution at this point, since the NCSS data 
may not be representative of the national population. A stronger inference should be possible 
once the data from the National Accident Sampling System (NASS) become available, and their 
combination with FARS data in a manner similar to that shown here should certainly be 
planned. 
For eight states for which model year distributions of vehicles involved in crashes were 
available, the number who died in cars with fires was obtained from the FARS. Table I I shows 
the rates of fatalities in crashes with fire to all crashes for these eight states for model years 
grouped by version of the standard. These fire-associated fatality rates are quite variable. One 
particularly large rate occurred in Illinois where 22 persons died in crashes with fire in cars of 
model years later than 1975 during 1977. (Nineteen vehicles were involved. so the large number 
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fable f 1. Fatality rater (per 1,004 crashes) in crashes. with iire For selected stater-FARS 1075 .md 1477 
of deaths did not result from one or two catastrophic crashes with multiple fatalities.) While 
wme states, such as Mjchi~~~n and Missouri, show reductions in the rates. others. such a\ 
Illinois and Texas, show increases. The overall pattern is unclear because of the variability of 
the rates, but it is evident that the reductions in crash-fire rates estimated previously were not 
observed in the fatal crashes-at least on the individual state level. 
The number of fatalities in cars that caught on fire in the crash is given for each group of 
model years corresponding to versions of FMVSS 301 in Table 12. The data arc from the FARS 
for accidents in each of the calendar years 1976 and 1977. The number of vehicles that caught 
fire when involved in fatal crashes is shown in parentheses in the table. There is no adequate 
national source for the number of cars involved in crashes during these years separately hy the 
model year groups. Jn part this is caused by the different definitions of crash among the states. 
An alterative is to use the number of registered vehicles as denominators for these numbers of 
fatalities. These data are given in Table 13. However, a complication arise\. The registration 
data are compiled annualfy, as of Jufy t of each year indicated. The regjstr~~ti~~ns are grouped hy 
the version of the standard. No I978 vehicles have been included, so the latest group contain\ 
only model years 1976 and 1977. The data are taken from Wards Automotive Reportjl976. 1977 
and 1978) and were originally compiled by R. L. Polk. 
Because of the difference in the compilation of the fatal accident data and the registrations. 
it is not clear which year’s registrations are best used as denominators. For cxampic. the I976 
farai data show a small number (56) of fatalities associated with crashes with fire for 1976 mod&. 
In part this is due to the lack of exposure of 19% models during J97h. Most 1976 car\ 
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0.0914 0.0857 0.0874 
0.0866 0.0978 0.1124 
0.0834 Il.0701 0.0734 
0.0827 0.0846 0.0944 
did not have a full year’s driving exposure during 1976. On the other hand, using the 
registrations as of I July 1976 excludes all 1976 models sold after that date, presumably a 
substantial number. The use of 1976 registration with 1976 fatalities seems best-the lower 
number of registrations may approximately offset the reduced exposure. Table 14 gives the 
fatalities in fatal accidents with fires divided by the registrations. The table also presents the 
proportion of vehicles involved in fatal accidents with fire to the registered vehicles for each of 
the two years. Inspection of these rates makes it apparent that the hoped for reduction of 
fatalities in crashes with fires has not been observed. While the proportions decrease in the 1976 
data, they increase in the 1977 data as one moves across the table from left to right, 
corresponding to the earlier to later model year groups. 
While there are certainly limitations in the data, it seems a reasonable conclusion that the 
FMVSS 301 has had no observable effect on fatalities in crashes with fires. It is possible that 
the other factors in the fatal accidents have changed and have covered up a possible effect of 
FMVSS 301. However, it is unlikely that such factors would have obliterated a beneficial effect as 
large as some expected[Cooley, 19741. It also seems that the reduction in crash fires observed 
coincident with the standard has not translated itself over into a corresponding reduction in 
fatalities. 
It should be noted that these fatalities are fatalities that occurred in crashes with fire. The 
fatalities did not necessarily result from the fire. Some would have occurred whether or not 
there was a fire, some may have resulted directly from the fire, and some may have been 
contributed to by the fire. In general, detailed autopsy results are necessary to determine 
whether a particular crash fatality resulted from a fire, from other injuries suffered in the crash, 
or from a combination of injuries from the crash and burns from the fire. Such data are not 
available in the FARS. Cooley(19741 compares a number of data sources on crash fire fatalities 
and concludes that from 50 to 60% of the fatalities in crashes with fires resulted from the fire, at 
least in part. That is, these fatalities might not have occurred if there had been no fire. At least 
some of these, however, involved life threatening injuries besides those resulting from the fire. 
Thus any effect that FMVSS 301 would have on fatalities in crashes accompanied by fire would 
presumably apply only to the 40-50% fo the fatalities that were caused in part by injuries 
resulting from the fire. 
SUMMARY 
The main purpose of FMVSS 301 was to reduce deaths and injuries resulting from fires in 
automobile crashes. It aimed to accomplish this by strengthening the fuel sustem to reduce the 
fuel spillage in a crash, thereby reducing the chance of fuel-fed fires. The data on fuel leakage in 
crashes are quite limited and rather mixed, but it does appear that the chance of fuel leakage in 
a crash is reduced for more recent model year cars. Whether this is a result of the standard or a 
consequence of the fact that these cars were newer when they were involved in a crash cannot 
be determined. 
Data on occurrence of fire in a crash were more plentiful. There were large differences in 
definitions and consequently in the levels of fire rates among states. As a consequence the data 
were converted to percent changes for calculating a consensus result. A significant reduction in 
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post-crash fire rates was observed to coincide with each of two versions of FMVSS 301. Thi\ 
does not appear to have been a result merely of the different ages of the cars, and adjustment\ 
for other variables such as type of crash proved to result in little change. While it is not possible 
to ascribe causality, it seems a reasonable conclusion that the standard resulted in significant 
reductions in the occurrence of post-crash fires. 
Data on injuries were too limited to be of use or could not be related to tires. In order to be 
used such data would have to include information about the types of injuries suffered in crashey 
with fire, so that the injuries not resulting from the fire could be separated from the additional 
injuries resulting from the occurrence of a post-crash fire. 
To some extent, the same is true of fatalities. Many fatalities (about half according to 
Cooley(l9741) in crashes with fire would have occurred even if no fire had resulted from the 
crash. In the other half of fatalities in crashes with fire, the injuries reported on the autopsy 
reports reviewed by Cooley would not necessarily have been fatal -had they not been 
accompanied by burns or additional injuries caused by the fire, No reduction in fatalities in 
crashes with fire was observed. If the estimated reduction in crash fires had carried over to 
result in a reduction in fatalities, a reduction of fatalities in crashes with fire of from 7 to 13% 
would hve been expected, allowing for half of the fatalities in newer models in crashes with fire 
to have resulted whether or not the fire occurred. This was not observed. It may be that the 
variability of the fatals is too large to observe such a small change. This is suggested by the fact 
that a reduction in fatals in crashes with fire was seen in 1976, but an increase was observed in 
1977. Another possibility is that the use of registration data (owing to the lack of national crash 
data) obliterated any change. It may be that the nature of crashes resulting in fatalities ha< 
changed, being more severe crashes than in the past, thus making fires more likely. but being in 
general such severe crashes that survival would be unlikely even without a fire. 
CONCLUSIONS 
FMVSS 301 appears to have been effective in reducing the incidence of post-crash fires b\ 
about 2S% compared to pre-standard vehicles; by about 13% for the latest version of the 
standard, compared to the first version of the standard; and by about 16% for the first version 
of the standard compared to pre-standard vehicles. Other factors may have contributed to the 
reduction, but several possible factors apparently did not. While a reduction in post-crash fire 
rates associated with the standard seems reasonable, a similar reduction in fatalities could not 
be demonstrated. Thus, there is some question of the effect of the standard on its primary goal. 
The data on fatalities are far from conclusive and it is possible that a reduction may be evident 
when more data are available. 
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